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1. Introduction
The size of government deficits and the time path of debt are of cen-
tral importance in the political discussions that shape economic poli-
cies in Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) countries. For example, in the U.S. active fiscal policymak-
ing has been limited by frequent disputes between the President and
the Congress over the constitutional balance budget amendment. In
Europe, the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has been a
topic of intense debates in the last few years. In the past, membership
to the European Monetary Union (EMU) strongly depended on deficit
policies, but initially virtuous countries such as France, Germany and
the Netherlands have joined ranks with initially less virtuous ones like
Italy, Portugal and Greece in passing the upper bound set for the deficit
to GDP ratio. Furthermore, in some of these countries, the net-of-inter-
est debt to GDP ratio started growing again after the decline of the late
1990s. The implications of fiscal policy decisions for the maintenance of
monetary stability have attracted the attention of central bankers and
academics have started investigating how exuberant fiscal policy may
affect local and union wide prices (see e.g., Canova and Pappa 2003).
Restrictions on fiscal policy actions have been criticized on a number
of grounds. Critics often stress that fiscal constraints limit the ability of
governments to react to fluctuations in the local economy. Two unde-
sirable consequences may result. First, since government capability to
stabilize the economy is reduced, the volatility of macrovariables could
be increased. Second, since expenditures must follow the revenue cycle,
budget restrictions may make expenditure procyclical. Hence, tight bud-
get constraints may amplify fluctuations, turning slowdowns into deep
recessions.328 Canova & Pappa
Despite the popular appeal of this argument, Canzoneri, Cumby, and
Diba (2002) suggest that fiscal policy in the U.S. and Europe has hardly
focused on macroeconomic stabilization over the last two decades. Two
complementary reasons may account for this. First, given the lags in the
legislative process, discretionary fiscal policy may be unable to coun-
teract business cycle fluctuations. Second, since automatic stabilizers
are roughly given at business cycle frequencies, and since their share in
total expenditure is typically large, the nondiscretionary component of
expenditure cannot vary substantially over the cycles. Hence, limiting
fiscal actions cannot dramatically alter the magnitude and the shape of
cyclical fluctuations.
Supporters of fiscal restrictions, on the other hand, suggest that the
medium term benefits of limiting government actions dominate the
short run costs incurred by the inability of fiscal policy to react to busi-
ness cycle conditions (see e.g., Diaz Gimenez, et al. 2003; and Andres
and Domenec 2002). This argument is usually based on two principles.
First, by limiting the ability of governments to run politically motivated
deficits and unsustainable levels of debt, fiscal constraints make gov-
ernments more credible, reduce the suboptimality of political games,
and induce a smoother path for taxes, which is the optimal policy to
follow in a number of theoretical models (see e.g., Alesina and Perotti
1996). Second, since fluctuations in expenditure may have been them-
selves a source of undesirable fluctuations, restraining fiscal policy may
actually stabilize the economy.
As for the first principle, the literature has made an important dis-
tinction between flexible rules, which allow for some sensitivity of defi-
cit and debt to economic conditions, or apply to consumption but not
to investment and infrastructure expenditures, and strict ones. On the
other hand, the evidence on the contribution of fiscal shocks to macro-
economic fluctuations is contradictory. Standard dynamic general equi-
librium models of fiscal policy (see e.g., Baxter and King (1993), Duarte
and Wolman (2002), or Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2004)) have a
hard time producing sizable fluctuations in response to fiscal distur-
bances in closed economy models calibrated to match salient features
of OECD business cycles. Empirically, Mountford and Uhlig (2002),
Canova and Pappa (2003) and Perotti (2004) have shown that expendi-
ture shocks can at times produce economically significant output and
employment multipliers.
Critics and supporters of fiscal constraints however do agree on one
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lasting repercussions. Borrowing, for example, reduces resources avail-
able to future generations and, if it is used to finance consumption, it
may induce a misallocation of resources. Therefore, the design of fis-
cal restrictions must carefully balance incentives and constraints and
include intratemporal and intertemporal considerations.
While there is evidence that fiscal restraints have provided some
safeguard against the misuse of public funds (see e.g., Poterba (1994)
and Bohn and Inman (1996); Von Hagen (1991) has an opposite view),
very little is known about the macroeconomic consequences of imposing
fiscal constraints. Gali (1994), Gali and Perotti (2003), Fatas and Mihov
(2003), Lane (2003) and Sorensen, Wu, and Yosha (2001) have exam-
ined some aspects of the relationship between fiscal variables and the
macroeconomy, but to the best of our knowledge, no empirical study
has simultaneously studied whether fiscal constraints alter (i) the busi-
ness cycle features of macroeconomic variables, (ii) the transmission
properties of fiscal shocks and (iii) the fiscal rules that governments
follow. We can think of several reasons for why the literature is silent
on these questions. First, it is difficult to find case studies where tight
fiscal constraints have been imposed in countries which originally had
no fiscal restrictions. Second, over the cross section, countries which
have loose deficit restrictions typically have tighter debt constraints.
Third, fiscal disturbances are difficult to identify since the systematic
and the unsystematic components of policy are highly intertwined
and "surprises" may induce macroeconomic changes before they are
implemented. Fourth, fiscal rules may be subject to predictable changes
at election times, or at times of political turmoil. Last, but not least,
cross country data is typically short and hard to obtain at the quarterly
frequency.
This paper studies how fiscal constraints affect the macroeconomy
using data from 48 U.S. states for the sample 1969-1995. First, we exam-
ine whether fiscal constraints alter the volatility and the comovements of
state macroeconomic variables, grouping states with a number of indi-
cators capturing different aspects of existing fiscal restrictions. Second,
we examine the transmission properties of two types of government
expenditure disturbances (one financed by debt and one by distortion-
ary taxation) for a typical state with loose or strict fiscal restrictions.
Finally, we back out the typical expenditure rules (one for each type
of shock) for states with different fiscal restrictions and compare them.
We use both asymptotic and small sample tests to measure the statis-
tical significance of the difference in the statistics across groups and330 Canova & Pappa
corroborate the analysis by evaluating the economic consequences of
the differences we found.
Why use U.S. states to assess the macroeconomic consequences of fis-
cal constraints? There are many reasons for our choice. First, the cross
section of U.S. states is rich enough to include cases where rules are
strict, others where they are somewhat loose and one case where no
fiscal restrictions are in place (e.g., Vermont). Second, there is one state
(Tennessee) where the nature of fiscal restrictions changed from loose
to tight within the sample. Third, the available data covers a sufficiently
long span of time (27 years), including both expansionary and reces-
sionary periods, and a comparable data set for OECD countries is not
available. Finally, deficit and debt constraints in U.S. states typically
exclude capital expenditure. Therefore, they fall within the class of flex-
ible rules which academics and policymakers consider desirable.
We find that the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal constraints
have been overemphasized. While point estimates and, at times, the
sign of the statistics we compute for states with strict fiscal constraints
differ from those of states with loose fiscal constraints, differences are
statistically insignificant and, often, economically unimportant. This
result holds regardless of how we define "loose," or "strict," of whether
deficit, debt, or institutional constraints are examined, of the type of
statistical tests we employ and, to a large extent, the statistics and the
sample we consider. For example, standard second moments that the
literature has used to characterize business cycle fluctuations are simi-
lar in states with loose and strict restrictions. Furthermore, fiscal restric-
tions have little impact both qualitatively and quantitatively on how
fiscal disturbances are transmitted to the real economy. Finally, fiscal
restrictions may not necessarily alter the ability of the government to
respond to the state of the economy and only marginally explain the
differences in fiscal rules across U.S. states.
Why is it that fiscal constraints appear to make so little macroeco-
nomic difference? We show that the main reason is the ability of state
governments to work around the rules and transfer expenditure items
to either less restricted accounts, or to less constrained portions of
the government. In addition, the presence of rainy days funds, which
are available to all state governments by the end of the sample, effec-
tively limits current expenditure cuts at times when the constraints
become binding. Given that constraints apply only to a portion of the
total budget, that no formal provision for the enforcement of the con-
straints exists and that rainy days funds play a buffer-stock role, it is notThe Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Constraints 331
surprising to find that tight fiscal constraints do not statistically alter
the magnitude and the nature of macroeconomic fluctuations.
Our results have important implications for the design of fiscal
restrictions. If constraints are imposed to keep government behavior
under control, tight restrictions may be the wrong way to go, since they
simply imply more creative accounting practices, unless they come
together with clearly stated and easily verifiable enforcement require-
ments. That is to say, tight fiscal constraints are neither a necessary nor
a sufficient condition for good government performance. On the other
hand, if constraints are imposed to reduce default probabilities, or to
limit the effects that local spending has on average area wide inflation,
and given that their negative macroeconomic effects appear to be mar-
ginal, tight constraints with some carefully selected escape route could
be preferable.
Is there a lesson to be learned from the results for the reform of the
SGP? While Canova and Pappa (2003) have shown that the response of
macroeconomic variables to fiscal shocks in the two monetary unions
share a number of important similarities, care should be exercised to
use our evidence for that purpose. There are at least three reasons that
make most of our conclusions dubious in a European environment.
First, U.S. state labor markets are sufficiently flexible, people move
across states and other margins (such as relative prices) quickly adjust
to absorb macroeconomic shocks. Europe is different in this respect and
the imposition of tighter fiscal restrictions in the EMU may have com-
pletely different effects. Second, since fiscal constraints in the United
States almost always exclude capital account expenditures, the con-
clusions we reach are not necessarily applicable to situations where
nongolden rule type of constraints are in place. Third, social security,
medical and welfare expenditures constitute the largest portion of cur-
rent account expenditure of European countries, while they are a tiny
portion of expenditure of U.S. states (less than four percent). Given that
such expenditures are inflexible and, to a large extent, a cyclical, direct
extension of our conclusions to the European arena should be avoided.
Nevertheless, we would like to stress that, while the presence of strict
fiscal constraints does not make an important difference for cyclical
fluctuations, some fiscal restriction is present in all but one U.S. states.
Therefore, none of our conclusions implies the abandonment of some
kind of legislated fiscal restraint.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next sec-
tion describes the empirical model, explains our methodology and332 Canova & Pappa
compares it with those typically used in the literature. The third section
presents the procedure used to identify fiscal shocks and to construct
fiscal rules. The fourth section describes how indicators capturing defi-
cit and debt restrictions are constructed. The fifth section presents the
results and the sixth section compares our results to the existing litera-
ture. The seventh section concludes.
2. The Model and the Methodology
The results presented in this paper are primarily obtained using VARs.
While unconditional volatilities and correlations can be obtained with-
out a VAR, we use such a model also for these statistics to unify our
empirical analysis.
We have gathered annual data for 48 U.S. states (DC, Alaska and
Hawaii are excluded) for the period 1969 to 1995.
1 The relative short-
ness of the data prevents us not only from studying the transmission of
shocks across states but also the estimation of a model which simultane-
ously includes a number of state and union wide variables. Given these
limitations, we are forced to neglect possible neighborhood effects and
choose, for each unit, five endogenous variables, four exogenous vari-
ables and a constant. The endogenous variables are: the log of the state
to the union wide price level; the log of the state to the union wide real
per-capita output; the log of the state to the union wide employment
level; the log of state real government revenues and the log of state
real government consumption expenditure, both in per-capita terms
and deflated by state prices. Scaling state variables by their union wide
level kills two birds with one stone: it transforms trending variables
into stationary ones; and it allows us to directly control for fluctuations
that are aggregate in nature. Note that our scaling does not exclude
the possibility that aggregate U.S. cycles have a spatial dimension, nor
the possibility that time series have infrequent mean shifts so long as
they are shared by the aggregate variables. Note also that we use total
state and local expenditure in the analysis to take into account possible
off-budget activities where expenditures are shifted to less restricted
parts of the government whenever constraints become binding. The
exogenous variables we employ are the area-wide nominal interest
rate, the level of oil prices, the Federal aid to the states and the state
debt to output ratio. The first three variables are used to control for
aggregate area-wide supply and demand effects; local debt enters the
specification following the suggestions of the fiscal theory of the priceThe Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Constraints 333
level (see Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000) for a survey), and the work
of Canova and Pappa (2003). State debt includes both guaranteed and
nonguaranteed debt, to capture possible substitution effects induced by
debt limits. The sources of the data and the definition of the variables
are in the appendix. The Schwarz criteria indicate that one lag of the
endogenous variable suffices to capture the dynamics and exogenous
variables enter only contemporaneously in the system, except for debt,
which enters with one lag.
2
The literature has typically employed a two-stage strategy to ana-
lyze the effects that unit specific characteristics have on the dynam-
ics of government finances, on the probability of (large) deficits and,
in general, on the relationship between government expenditure and
macroeconomic activity. In the first stage the time series dimension is
employed to extract the information on relevant parameters and, in the
second stage, the cross sectional dimension is used to explain the het-
erogeneity in estimated parameters using unit specific political, insti-
tutional, or economic characteristics. For example, Bohn and Inman
(1996) run a static first stage time series regression of the type yit =
Q. + axjt + eit for each state, where eit ~ (0, G
2), yit is the state surplus and
xjt a vector of macrovariables including output, employment, etc., and
then run a cross sectional regression Q. = z{y+ v{ where z. are observable
state characteristics. Sorensen, Wu and Yosha (2001), Lane (2003) and
Fatas and Mihov (2003), on the other hand, run a first stage regression
of the type yit = Q. + oc.Axjt + eit where yit is the budget surplus, the expen-
diture to output ratio, the revenue to output ratio, or transformations of
them, Axit includes contemporaneous, or contemporaneous and lagged
macroeconomic variables and then attempt to explain differences in
a. (or in <r.) with cross sectional regressions of the type d{ = z1{y+ vv or
6 = (7n + zo.<5 + v., where z,. could be different than z... While popular,
these two-stage procedures produce incorrect estimates of y, or 8. In
addition, it is hard to predict the direction of bias without knowing
exactly what is the data generating process of the cross sectional dimen-
sion of the panel.
Intuitively, there are three problems. First, specifications like those
of Bohn and Inman (1996) neglect slope heterogeneity: a. may be dif-
ferent from a if unit i and j regressors are correlated with individual
characteristics (which is likely to be the case if, e.g., xit includes output
and zi labor market, or other national regulations). Neglecting slope
heterogeneities produces biased and inconsistent estimates of a and,
given the structure of the resulting error term, an instrumental variable334 Canova & Pappa
(IV) approach is unlikely to solve the inconsistency problem (see e.g.,
Pesaran and Smith (1995)). Second, specifications that allow for slope
heterogeneities but exclude lagged dependent variables, like Sorensen,
Wu, Yosha (2001), or Lane (2003), omit regressors which are, by con-
struction, correlated with the included ones whenever Axit is serially
correlated. Lagged dependent variables are likely to be important in
the first stage regression because all fiscal variables are serial corre-
lated. Omission of lags of the left hand side variable produces biased
and inconsistent estimates of the first stage parameters and therefore
renders second stage regression uninterpretable. Also in this case, an
IV approach is unlikely to work since it is difficult to find instruments
which effectively break the correlation between the regressors and
the errors. Third, even when slope heterogeneity is accounted for and
lagged dependent variables are included in the first stage regression
(as in Fatas and Mihov (2003)), second stage estimates neglect the fact
that a;(or in <j.) have been estimated. Hence, estimates of y(8) may be
significant even when the "true" effect is negligible.
To illustrate these problems consider the model
ytt =
 XJ> + xwa{ + eit (1)
« = x2iy+ vi (2)
where i = 1, 2, ..., N, xlit is a 1 x K2 vector of exogenous and lagged
dependent variables, x2i is a K2 x K3 vector of time invariant unit specific
characteristics, xQit is a 1 x Kt vector of unit specific variables (possibly
depending on t) and yis a K3 x 1 vector of parameters. We assume that
E(xliteH) = E(x2p) = 0 that eit ~ N(0, a
1); that E(e,, e.,) = 0 V t* rand i W;
and v. ~ N(0, Eo). Stacking the observations for each i and using (2) into
(1) we get 1/ = x,.Q. + X.y+ e where X. = xvx,. is a T x k matrix, and s =
v ' O Ji 0; i i' i i \i 2x 3 ' i
xvv. + e. so that var(£.) = x, E x\. + a
21 = 2 .
Given £ and y the maximum likelihood estimator of Q. is Q.... =
£j ' ! l,ML
(x'.Ir
1 xn)~Hx'.IT
1 (y. - X.f) and conditional on £ , the maximum like-
v o/ v 0;'
 v oi v^" i it' £i'
lihood estimator of r is v»,r = (2. X. Q"
1 X.)"
1 (Z. X. Qr\ y) where Q,
1 =
• 'ML
 v / i i v






le.. After some algebraic manipulations one
obtains
E'yM'L= (I..^Pfx^(L.x'2.p-
1 a) where P. = (x'^Q, Hence, y
is a weighted average of the first stage estimates a{ with weights given
by V,








1^,)- Therefore, y2step incorrectly measures
the effect of x2j on a for two reasons. First, suppose that xm = 0, Vt. ThenThe Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Constraints 335
the term cr
2^. x1() is missing from the formulas of %s(e and of its stan-
dard error (£. x'2i Ir^ x2i)
03. This means that, while the weights used in
y2ste depend on Ep, those in yML depend on £. and on the volatility of the
unit specific regressors cr^x'^x^). Second, if xm ^ 0, there are additional
terms in Q.., measuring the influence that these regressors have on djr
which are left out from y2ste. Since the standard error of ylste is underes-
timated, a two-step regression gives an overoptimistic representation
of the significance of the relationship. Moreover, if a{ is systematically
larger when xxi is more volatile, a positive y2st may be obtained even
when the true effect is negative. These observations should be kept
in mind when comparing our results with those existing in the litera-
ture. In fact, our methodology takes care of all of these problems. First,
lagged dependent variables appear in the model for each state. Second,
we allow for heterogeneity in regression coefficients and in the vari-
ances across units. Third, we construct maximum likelihood estimates
of y by plugging
and
into the relevant formulas. Our estimators are consistent when the num-
ber of units in each group is large (see e.g., Pesaran and Smith (1995))
and reproduce the random coefficient Bayesian estimators, when unin-
formative priors are used.
Since in our case x2i are dichotomous variables, implementing yML is
equivalent to calculating the "typical" effect separately in states with
loose and strict restrictions. Then the equality of the statistics across
groups can be examined using asymptotic ^
2-tests, or nonparametric
devices (such as a small sample rank sum test).
3. Identifying Fiscal Shocks
To examine the transmission of expenditure shocks and the systematic
response of expenditure to macroeconomic fluctuations we need to
identify fiscal shocks. Such an enterprise is typically complicated and
this may explain why only a small number of studies have engaged
in such an activity (see e.g., Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg,336 Canova & Pappa
Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999), Mountford and Uhlig (2002), Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004), Canova
and Pappa (2003), Pappa (2004), Perotti (2004)).
Three features make fiscal shocks difficult to extract. First, fiscal pol-
icy is rarely unpredictable. A fiscal change is usually subject to long dis-
cussions and political debates before it is implemented. These delays
make standard innovation accounting problematic: agents adjust their
behavior to the new conditions when the old regime still prevails; mac-
rovariables start moving before the shock occurs and no surprise is
measurable at the time when the policy change actually takes place.
This "non-fundamentalness" problem plagues fiscal shocks more than
other types of policy disturbances. Second, even when the policy stance
is unchanged, expenditures and revenues move in response to the state
of the economy. Therefore, it is necessary to carefully distinguish exog-
enous shifts from endogenous reactions to business cycle conditions.
Third, since fiscal and monetary policy actions may be related, identify-
ing fiscal shocks in isolation may produce misleading results.
Our set up is designed to avoid, in principle, all these problems. First,
because we consider a monetary union, we take monetary policy as
given when examining state fiscal policy. We do this by imposing the
exogeneity of the economy wide interest rate with respect to state vari-
ables. Second, since all variables are endogenous in the VAR and since
we control for both the state of the local and of the aggregate business
cycle, there is no need to produce cyclically adjusted estimates of fiscal
variables. Third, since we precisely define the type of fiscal disturbances
we are looking for and the timing of the responses of the endogenous
variables is largely unrestricted, the non-fundamentalness problem is
also considerably eased. In particular, we seek for expenditure shocks
that produce positive comovements in state deficits and in state output
(G); and for expenditure shocks that leave state deficit unchanged and
generate negative comovements with state output (BB).
The first type of expenditure shocks is the one usually encountered
in macroeconomic textbooks and dynamic RBC and New-Keynesian
sticky-price models (see e.g., Baxter and King (1993), or Pappa (2004)): an
unexpected increase in spending, financed by bond creation increases,
by definition, state deficits and boosts aggregate demand and output.
In identifying this type of shock we are agnostic about the behavior of
revenues—they are allowed to stay unchanged, or comove with expen-
diture as long as the correlation is not perfect—and about the timing of
output responses—they could be contemporaneous, lagged, or leadingThe Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Constraints 337
the shock. However, we assume that over the horizon of the analysis,
distorting taxes are not used to redeem government debt.
The second type of shocks is budget-balanced shocks: expansionary
expenditure disturbances are required to produce an instantaneous
increase in revenues so as to leave state deficits unchanged, and to gen-
erate a fall in state output. These dynamics are standard in general equi-
librium models of fiscal policy. For example, Baxter and King (1993) and
Ohanian (1997) showed that in a RBC type model an increase in spend-
ing, financed through labor taxation, temporarily decreases consump-
tion and investment and has protracted negative output effects. While
the sign of the output effect is robust across models, the magnitude
of the fall depends on the source of financing (e.g., income taxes vs.
sales taxes), on the elasticity of labor and capital supply to distortion-
ary taxes and on whether a balanced budget is imposed on a period-
by-period basis, or if some flexibility is allowed. Also in this case the
timing of the output effect is unrestricted. Hence, anticipatory effects,
or future increases in distorting taxation of the type considered by, e.g.,
Dotsey (1994), are not a-priori ruled out. We summarize the identifying
restrictions in Table 1.
It is incorrect to classify the disturbances we extract as RBC, or
Keynesian shocks. For example, in a simple IS-LM model, balance
budget shocks have unitary fiscal multipliers, but this occurs because
lump sum taxation is used to finance the expenditure. When distorting
taxes are used the multipliers could be negative in this case also. Our
preferred distinction instead focuses on the form of financing: debt, or
lump sum taxes for G shocks, distorting taxes for BB shocks. With this
classification RBC and traditional, or new-Keynesian models all have
the same implications as far as output and deficits are concerned.
Clearly, we do not expect G and BB shocks to be identified in all
states. In theory, G shocks should be present only in those states that
allow deficit carryover and BB shocks only in states with strict bal-
ance budget restrictions. However, balance budget legislation applies
only to the general funds and there is no enforcement mechanism
Table 1
Identification restrictions
Corr(G,Y) Corr (T,Y) Corr (G, Def) Corr(T, Def) Corr(GJ)
G shocks >0 >0 >0but<l.
BB shocks <0 =0 = 1338 Canova & Pappa
insuring that rules are not bent and nonguaranteed debt can typically
be issued without popular uproar. Therefore, it is possible to have fiscal
disturbances that look like G shocks even in states with tight balance
budget rules. Conversely debt restrictions may produce disturbances
that look like BB shocks even in states with somewhat loose budgetary
restrictions. Finally one can easily conceive situations where both type
of shocks could be identified in one state (e.g., if different financing
restrictions apply to different components of the budget). Rather than
a-priori excluding these possibilities, we let the data tell us whether
there are states that do not conform to the theoretical expectations and
condition our analysis on the results of the identification exercise.
Since our identification procedure, which is based on the sign of the
conditional comovements of expenditure, deficit and output, differs
from the one typically used in the VAR literature, it is useful to spend a
few words highlighting the advantages of our strategy. The existing lit-
erature typically uses case study approaches, extraneous information,
or zero restrictions on the contemporaneous covariance matrix of VAR
shocks to disentangle fiscal shocks from reduced form innovations.
Case studies (see e.g., Ramey and Shapiro (1998), or Burnside, Eichen-
baum, and Fisher (2004)) are a powerful way to measure the effect of
fiscal surprises if the changes are truly exogenous. As argued in Perotti
(2004), exogeneity is dubious in two of the three typically studied epi-
sodes (Korean War, Vietnam war, Reagan buildup). The identification
restrictions we use are theory based, while those employed in the lit-
erature are, to a large extent, conventional and hard to justify with low
frequency data like ours. For example, assuming that it takes more than
a period for government spending to respond to unexpected output
movements is unappealing in annual data because of the presence of
automatic stabilizers. Since we do not use zero restrictions, typical
endogeneity and underidentification problems are considerably eased.
To recover shocks with the required characteristics we use the meth-
odology of Canova and De Nicolo (2002). The approach starts from the
eigenvalue-eigenvector orthogonalization of the variance covariance
matrix of VAR residuals and proceeds examining the responses of the
endogenous variables to each of the orthogonalized shocks. If we are
unable to find expenditure shocks producing the required comove-
ments in the variables, the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition is
multiplied by an orthonormal matrix Q(0), where 0is a parameter, and
the comovements in response to the new set of shocks are examined.
This search process continues, varying 6, or changing the form of Q (0)
for a fixed 9, until shocks with the required characteristics are found.
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4. Characterizing Restrictions on Government Behavior
All U.S. states, except Vermont, face some kind of deficit restrictions
and the majority of them also face debt restrictions. However, deficit
restrictions are at times loosely formulated; in some cases they are
flexible enough to impose only weak constraints on spending behavior,
and in others the debt limit is large enough to be hardly ever binding.
Finally, the enforcement of budget and debt constraints varies across
states. Hence, it is important to appropriately distinguish situations
where constraints are strict from those where they are loose.
As far as deficits are concerned, restrictions can be imposed ex-ante,
or ex-post. Ex-ante restrictions require the governor to present, or the
legislature to approve, a balanced budget. Submitting or passing a bal-
anced budget is a weak constraint since it does not exclude the pos-
sibility that, at the end of the year, the state will actually run a deficit
if revenues fall below the expected values. When ex-ante restrictions
are used, statutory, or constitutional provisions for balancing the defi-
cit may be used to prevent perpetual roll over into the infinite future.
Therefore, the timing for balancing the budget can also serve to induce
fiscal discipline. With ex-post rules, the budget has to be balanced in
each fiscal cycle (typically one, at times two years). This means that
when economic activity falls short of expectations, state tax rates must
be increased, expenditure cut, or federal aid collected. If, despite the
attempts, a deficit remains it is carried over but is required to be bal-
anced by the end of the next year. Note that since ex-post rules apply
only to the general fund, balanced budget practices may still be unre-
stricted if it is possible to shift items across accounts, or funds.
4 Fur-
thermore, the presence of rainy day funds, which can be accumulated
in expansions and used to cushion unexpected shortfalls in revenues,
may considerably ease the severeness of the constraints imposed by
ex-post rules.
To account for these differences, we follow Bohn and Inman (1996),
and construct three indicators capturing different aspects of deficit
restrictions. In the first (Ex-ante) an entry of one is given to states where
the governor must submit, or the legislature must pass a balanced bud-
get and zero to the others. In the second (Carryover), an entry of one is
given to states which may not carry over a deficit for more than a year
and zero to the rest. In the third (Ex-post), a value of one is given to
states that are required to balance the budget within the current fiscal
cycle and zero to the others (see first three columns of Table 2). Here
we do not distinguish between constitutional and statutory restrictionsTable 2



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0The Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Constraints 341
since we wish to measure the effects of fiscal constraints on state activ-
ity and not to design institutions that more effectively limit government
actions.
In general, the information contained in the three indices overlaps.
For example, among the 12 states with ex-ante budget restrictions, nine
are allowed to carry over deficits for more than one year. For reference,
we also report in Table 2 the ACIR (1987) index. This index ranks states
on the basis of the effectiveness of their deficit restrictions, and com-
bines the information contained in our three indicators using grades
from 0 to 10 (with ten being the most effective restrictions), is a popular
choice in the literature. However, if we dichotomize it assigning a one to
states with a grade of eight or above and a zero to states with a grade of
six or below (as in Sorensen, Wu and Yosha (2001)), it becomes perfectly
collinear with the Ex-post index. Similarly, it becomes perfectly collinear
with the Ex-ante index if a grade of four is used as cut-off point.
As far as debt restrictions are concerned, constraints may refer to the
total, or only to the short run component of debt; they can be fixed in
nominal terms, formulated in proportion of revenues, or the size of the
states' general fund. To capture these differences, we construct three
additional indicators. In the first (Debtl), a value of one is entered to
states with some form of debt restriction and zero to the others. In the
second (Debt2), a value of one is attributed to states that either pro-
hibit guaranteed (full faith and credit) debt, or allow a nominal amount
below 200,000 dollars. A zero is given to all other states. In the third
(Shortdebt), a one is given to states that prohibit short term debt and a
zero to the others (see columns 5-7 in Table 2).
Finally, we construct three indicators capturing political/legal char-
acteristics that may influence the state fiscal stance. In the first (Veto),
a value of one is given to all states where the governor has line-item
veto power on the budget and zero to the others; in the second (Court)
a value of one is given to states where the Supreme Court is elected by
voters and a value of zero if it is appointed by the Governor, or the legis-
lature and in the third (Constitution) a one is given to states that need a
constitutional amendment to be able to borrow and zero to the others.
As suggested by Mitchell (1967), or Bohn and Inman (1996), these
characteristics may affect the fiscal stance for the following reasons.
First, since State Courts are responsible for the enforcement of budget
rules, it is conceivable that enforcement is less than perfect and moni-
toring looser whenever Courts are appointed by those who also leg-
islate the budget. Second, since constitutional amendments are much
harder to enact than referendums, or simple legislative actions, states342 Canova & Pappa
with such restrictions may face considerable constraints in their ability
to issue general obligation debt.
Finally, since fiscally conservative voters may hold Governors respon-
sible for any marginal expansion of state budgets, governors seeking
reelection may be more active in controlling spending and deficits. One
way to exercise this control is to use the veto power. Hence, as sug-
gested by Holtz-Eakin (1988), or Carter and Schap (1990), states where
the governor has a line-item veto power may be less prone to run a
deficit (see columns 8-10 of Table 2).
5. The Results
5.1 Volatilities and Correlations
To begin with we examine whether basic, reduced form business cycle
statistics are affected by the presence of fiscal restrictions. We summa-
rize cyclical information through nine statistics: the volatility of state
expenditure, the volatilities of state output, prices and employment in
deviation from their U.S. counterpart; their correlation with per-capita
real state consumption expenditure; the mean of the log consumption
expenditure to output ratio and the mean of per capita output.
There are several ways of computing volatilities and correlations.
For example, in the business cycle literature, it is common to filter out
long and short frequencies fluctuations and compute statistics for fluc-
tuations which on average are between two to six years. In cross unit
comparisons, however, one has to worry about the fact that cycle length
may differ in different units. In this latter case, it is more typical to com-
pute statistics using growth rates of the variables. Here we present sec-
ond moments obtained from the residuals of a VAR.
We prefer this approach for two reasons. First, given the short sample,
the variability and correlation properties at business cycle frequencies
may be poorly estimated with filtered data. Second, with the scaling
we employ, variables are stationary so moments can be computed with-
out any further transformation. Finally, by presenting results using the
residuals of the VAR, we account for predictable variations related to
the presence of automatic stabilizers which may be unaccounted for
when using raw data.
Table 3 reports the p-values of two tests. The first is an asymptotic
^
2-test measuring the differences, on average, in each of the statistics
across groups of states with different fiscal restrictions. Since we haveThe Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Constraints 343
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nine indicators of fiscal restrictions, different rows report the results
obtained with different classifications. The second is a nonparametric
rank sum test, measuring the difference in the distribution of each of
the statistics across groups. Since with some classifications the number
of units in each group is small; since critical values of such a test have
been tabulated for groups with as little as three units (see e.g., Hoel
(1993)), and since the test examines the entire distribution, as opposed
to the first moment, it may be more reliable to evaluate the statistical
significance of the differences.
The message of Table 3 is very clear: the presence of tighter budget,
debt, or institutional restrictions does not appear to matter for busi-
ness cycle fluctuations. In fact, when an asymptotic test is used, dif-
ferences across groups are insignificant, regardless of the classification344 Canova & Pappa
employed to group states. When a small sample test is used, only price
volatility is marginally statistically different across groups when the
Supreme Court indicator is used.
To provide visual content for this outcome we plot in Figure 1 the
estimated values of the nine statistics for each of the 48 states when we
use the Ex-post indicator to group states. A vertical bar in each graph
cuts off the 13 states with loose restrictions from those with strict ones.
Two features stand out from the figure. First, the mean difference in the
statistics across groups is not only statistically but also economically
small. For example, average relative output volatility in states with Ex-
post restrictions is only marginally higher than the average volatility
in states with no Ex-post restrictions (0.03 versus 0.02 percent), but the
opposite is true for relative employment volatility. Second, there are
considerable variations in the statistics within groups. For example, the
correlation between per-capita real consumption expenditure and rela-
tive output ranges from -0.38 to 0.62 in states with loose fiscal restric-
tions and from -0.53 to 0.41 in states with strict budget restrictions.
There are many reasons why the business cycle statistics we col-
lected are statistically similar across groups. One, often cited in the
literature (see Milesi-Ferretti 2003), is that state governments use cre-
ative accounting to avoid constraints when they become binding. For
example, governments may shift expenditure items off-the-budget, or
to less restricted branches (e.g., local governments), or use stabilization
funds to limit the revenue crunch they may experience in recessions.
Similarly, debt restrictions apply only to guaranteed debt. Hence, there
is an incentive for state governments to swap nonguaranteed (revenue)
for guaranteed debt when the borrowing limit becomes binding. Since
our data includes both local and state expenditures and we consider
total outstanding debt, we can study whether fiscal restrictions con-
straint government behavior, or simply imply substitution toward less
restricted accounts, bonds, or practices.
Table 4, which reports first and second moments of the level of total
state and local deficits and debt, of debt to output ratios and of the
growth rate of nonguaranteed to guaranteed debt, is consistent with
the idea that more restricted governments tend to substitute across
accounts to avoid the restrictions. In fact, the mean deficits appear to
be different in strongly restricted vs. weakly restricted states only when
the short term debt indicator is used and the rank test is used to evalu-
ate the differences while the debt to output ratio is significantly differ-













Moments using the Ex-post classification
also find that the growth rate of nonguaranteed to guaranteed debt is
not significantly different across groups of states with different debt
constraints. While this appears to be in contrast with the substitution
hypothesis, one should also notice that both types of states have sub-
stantially increased the less unrestricted form of debt financing over
time and this may account for our failure to detect differences.
A further piece of evidence on this issue comes from Figure 2 where
we plot the average (across states) ratio of local to state expenditure
over time. Three features deserve comment. First, there has been a sig-
nificant trend increase in the expenditure of the less restricted branches
of the government in the 1990s and this pattern is shared by states
with strict and loose fiscal restrictions. Second, states which are less
restricted have local expenditure that is consistently smaller than states
where Ex-post restrictions are in place—on average about 15 percent.
Third, both types of states tend to resort to local expenditure more dur-
ing periods of national wide recessions (see 1980-81 and 1990-91).
Overall, the evidence is supportive of the claim that tight fiscal restric-
tions have not produced, on average, more virtuous governments and,
as a consequence, have not altered the business cycle properties of state
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Average local to state expenditure
states with tight fiscal restrictions and, to a large extent, of the tests
used to evaluate the mean differences across groups and the statistics
employed. We also argue that this outcome seems due to the fact that
state governments have the ability to bend the rules and use creative
accounting to avoid the constraints.
While the evidence seems overwhelming, one important caveat
needs to be mentioned: the conclusions we have drawn are so far based
on "reduced form" statistics. Although volatilities and correlations are
unaffected by budget restrictions it is possible that the channels through
which fiscal policy shocks are transmitted to the state economy could
be significantly altered. In addition, tight budget, debt, or institutional
restrictions may imply different fiscal rules. Since our VAR model can
exactly examine these issues, we next turn to a more structural evalua-
tion of the macroeconomic effects of fiscal constraints.
5.2 The Transmission of Expenditure Shocks
The identification of structural expenditure shocks roughly produced
the expected results. We identify G disturbances in 36 states and
BB disturbances in 12 states; in seven states (Connecticut, Iowa,
Louisiana, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia) we fail to
recover any expenditure shock and in seven states (Kansas, Maryland,
Mississippi, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, West Virginia) we
identify both G and BB shocks. We have already mentioned that, since
our data includes state and local consumption expenditure, and since348 Canova & Pappa
expenditure switching practices seem to be widespread, shocks in states
with strict constraints may end up looking like G shocks. We find that
this is the case in 25 states. We also mentioned the possibility that states
with no strict budget requirement may nevertheless maintain close to
a balanced budget when manipulating the discretionary component of
expenditure. This seems to be the case in Maryland and Pennsylvania.
How is it that in some states both shocks are identified and in others
no shocks satisfy the restrictions we imposed? We conjecture that struc-
tural instability is responsible for both results. In fact, in states were no
expenditure shock is identified, the comovements of expenditure, defi-
cit and output are poorly estimated. On the other hand, the seven states
where both shocks are identified are among the last to establish stabi-
lization funds
5 and the variability of BB shocks in these states declines
considerably in the last ten years of the sample.
We measure the transmission of expenditure shocks to the local
economy for a "typical" state with strict or loose budget restrictions
using the one step methodology described in the second section. We
computed "typical" responses grouping states with our nine indica-
tors. Since conclusions are broadly robust, we only present outcomes
obtained using the Ex-post indicator and the Debt2 indicator. Figure
3 plots the mean response and a 68 percent confidence band of rela-
tive output (first row), relative employment (second row) and relative
prices (third row) following a G shock and Figure 4 the same informa-
tion following a BB shock when the Ex-post index is used. Figures 5
and 6 plot bands for the two types of shocks when the Debt2 indicator
is used to classify states.
Consider Figure 3. Qualitatively speaking, the responses of the three
variables to G shocks conform with theoretical expectations: expan-
sionary expenditure shocks boost aggregate demand and increase, on
average, relative employment in both groups of states. The pattern of
relative price responses is slightly different across columns: in fact, rela-
tive prices rise instantaneously when strict restrictions are in place yet
are instantaneously insignificant in states with loose restrictions. How-
ever, in both cases responses are positive after two years and remain
persistently and significantly above the trend for another five years.
A BB type disturbance, on average, significantly decreases relative
employment in both groups of states. Also this pattern conforms to
theoretical expectations since an expenditure increase, when financed
by distortionary taxation, is expected to have contractionary effects on
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Figure 3
Responses of macroeconomic variables, Ex-post classification
years for both groups of states but then turn positive and slightly dif-
ferent from zero in states with strict deficit restrictions.
The typical responses of output and employment to both shocks
in the two groups are also quantitatively similar. Take, for example,
G shocks. Here the maximum difference in the output and employ-
ment responses for the two groups are 0.12 and 0.06, respectively. But
the mean response of the two variables for the typical state with strict
restrictions is inside the band obtained for the typical state with loose
restrictions and the bands for the two groups of states largely overlap.
Furthermore, the qualitative difference in relative price responses we
have noted washes out once standard errors are accounted for.
Two other interesting features of Figures 3 and 4 need to be empha-
sized. First, the timing of the responses is largely unaltered by the pres-
ence of strict budget restrictions: the largest response of relative output
and relative employment is always instantaneous, while the response
of relative prices is slightly hump shaped. Second, the persistence of
the responses also looks similar across groups for both types of shocks.
For example, the half-life of the output responses to G shocks is about
two years for both groups while it is one year for both groups with BB






















Responses of macroeconomic variables, Ex-post classification
Is there any possibility that, although statistically insignificant, dif-
ferences across groups are economically relevant? Figures 3 and 4 are
not very informative on this issue. For example, comparing point esti-
mates it looks as if cumulative one year output multipliers for both
types of shocks are about 20 percent larger in states with strict fiscal
restrictions. However, any meaningful attempt to explain this differ-
ence (for example, noting that large fiscal shocks are less likely to occur
when strict fiscal constraints are in place) comes against the fact that the
uncertainty around point estimates is sufficiently large to make the two
multipliers indistinguishable.
Figures 5 and 6 confirm these conclusions. The only noticeable differ-
ence across states with strict/loose debt restrictions concerns the behav-
ior of employment with BB shocks. In fact, it appears that employment
is better shielded from the adverse economic effects of balance budget
shocks when loose debt constraints are in place. Also in this case, stan-
dard error bands largely overlap making differences at several horizons
statistically insignificant.
To summarize, the transmission of fiscal disturbances to the real
economy is both qualitatively and quantitatively unaltered by the pres-
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emerge when we look at relative price responses, but also in this case
differences are statistically insignificant. It is important to stress that
not only the magnitude of the responses but also their shape and their
persistence are unchanged by the restrictions. Why is it that we fail to
find differences across groups of states? Once again, part of the expla-
nation has to do with the fact that it is relatively easy to circumvent fis-
cal constraints. In fact, the response of deficits to G and BB shocks looks
very similar across groups of states. Another part of the explanation has
to do with the fact that flexible labor markets may compensate for the
inflexibility of fiscal policy. This flexibility may be the crucial difference
one should expect to encounter when trying to extend our conclusions
to Euro area countries.
5.3 Fiscal Rules
To analyze the systematic component of expenditure we compute the
contemporaneous policy rules implied by our structural VAR estimates
for each group of states.
6 We report in Table 5 average point estimates of
the coefficients on output, employment, prices and debt/output ratio
for each of the indicators used to group states. For interpretation pur-
poses coefficients are normalized so that expenditure appears on the
left hand side with a unitary coefficient.
Several interesting features emerge from the table. First, it appears
that different types of shocks imply different expenditure rules. With
G shocks, expenditure is generally leaning against relative output, rela-
tive employment and debt while it is roughly unresponsive to relative
prices. When BB shocks are considered, expenditure follows relative
output, leans against relative price movements and is roughly unre-
sponsive to the other two variables.
Second, while there are some changes in the sign of the output coef-
ficient across classifications, in many cases, only magnitude differences
are present. For example, for G shocks, expenditure is always leaning
against relative output movements when loose restrictions are in place
and it is following relative output movements when strict restrictions
are in place only with the three debt classifications. Expenditure also
follows relative output movements for both groups of states when BB
shocks are considered with eight of the nine indicators and it is only
with the Veto indicator that strict restrictions imply countercyclical
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Third, the signs of employment and price coefficients depend, to a
large extent, on the classification used and the magnitude of variations
is considerable. For example, with G shocks the average relative price
coefficient for states with loose restrictions runs from -2.75 to 10.64 and
the one for states with strict restrictions runs from -0.81 to 2.21.
Fourth, expenditure systematically responds in a stabilizing fashion
to debt/output ratio in both groups of states when G shocks are exam-
ined with all but one indicator. The magnitude of the average estimated
elasticity ranges from 0.05 to a large 2.82, and it is not necessarily true
that states with strict fiscal rules react differently, on average, to debt. A
more mixed pattern instead emerges when BB shocks are considered:
the signs change across classifications in a somewhat unpredictable
manner and no pattern is detectable.
But perhaps more importantly, regardless of the classification used
to group states and of the type of shocks considered, and even in those
cases when sign switches are present, differences across groups of states
are statistically insignificant. This is true both when average coefficients
are significantly different from zero and when they are not and occurs
because policy rules within groups are very heterogeneous. As an illus-
tration, take the Ex-post classification. There average relative prices and
relative employment coefficients are equal to -0.08 and 0.01 respec-
tively, (with standard errors equal to 1.82 and 1.32) when no restrictions
are in place, implying, for example, that a 1 percent movement in state
employment above the national level makes per-capita expenditure fall
by less than 0.1 percent. Expenditure becomes strongly countercyclical
with respect to relative employment movements and turns procyclical
with respect to relative prices movements, on average when restrictions
are in place (coefficients are -5.53 and 2.21, respectively). However,
standard errors are large also in this case (equal to 2.70 and 1.61, respec-
tively) making confidence bands around the mean largely overlap.
What does the large heterogeneity within group tell us about fiscal
rules? It appears that deficit, debt and political restrictions only mar-
ginally account for the differences in expenditure responses to busi-
ness cycle conditions across states. To put this result in another way, the
R
2 in a typical two-stage regression where fiscal dummies are used to
explain differences in the first stage slope estimates is negligible. This
suggests that other state characteristics (e.g., their location, the compo-
sition of output, or the trade pattern with neighboring states) could be
more important to explain differences in the cyclical responses of state
expenditure to movements in macro variables.The Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Constraints 355
6. Comparing Our Results to the Literature
Our results differ from some of those present in the literature. There-
fore, it is important to highlight the reasons which may account for
the differences. As mentioned the more structural part of our analy-
sis is novel and no comparison with the literature is available. For the
reduced form analysis, one should also remember that the extent of the
overlap is limited, since the literature has not focused on volatilities
and correlations.
For the latter type of analysis, there is one econometric reason, already
mentioned in the second section, which may account for the differences:
we use one-step estimators while the literature has employed two-
steps estimators for models like those in equations (l)-(2). Since our
estimators are consistent in a variety of circumstances and efficiently
account for uncertainty in the first stage estimates, the significance of
the difference found in the literature across groups of states could be
artificial.
There are two other reasons which may help to understand why
our results are different: the treatment of aggregate cycles and that of
dynamic heterogeneities.
All our results are obtained scaling state macroeconomic variables
by their U.S. average since this allows us to explicitly account for fluc-
tuations that are nationwide in nature. Such a scaling is not typically
employed in the literature and the list of economy wide variables used
to control for these factors is either short, or inexistent. Hence, what
appeared as different economic relationships in states with strict, or
loose fiscal restrictions could be biases induced by the omission of effec-
tive controls for economy wide business cycles.
We have also mentioned in the second section, the need to control for
dynamic heterogeneity in the analysis. It is often argued that U.S. states
are relatively homogeneous and that fixed effects suffice to account for
the differences. To show that this is far from being the case, we computed
output volatility separately pooling data for states with and without
Ex-post restrictions. A test for the significance of the differences in the
two groups has now a p-value of 0.04 (as opposed to 0.77 as reported in
Table 4), suggesting that dynamic heterogeneities within each group of
states are very important. Since failure to take dynamic heterogeneities
into account causes biases and inconsistencies, differences between our
results and those presented in the literature can also be due to the poor
properties of the estimators others have used.356 Canova & Pappa
7. Conclusions
This paper analyzed whether tight fiscal constraints affect the macro-
economic performance of 48 U.S. states for the period 1969-1995. First,
we studied the volatility and the comovements of a number of state
variables. In each case we constructed a mean estimator for groups of
states with different fiscal constraints and evaluated the statistical and
economic significance of the differences. Second, we examined the dif-
ferences in the transmission properties of expenditure disturbances
financed by debt, or by distortionary taxation for a typical state with
or without fiscal restrictions. Finally, we backed out expenditure rules
(one for each of the two shocks) for states with loose and strict restric-
tions and compared them.
We find that the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal constraints
have been overemphasized. While the sign and the magnitude of point
estimates are, at times, different, these differences are statistically insig-
nificant and economically unimportant. Our conclusions are robust in
a number of dimensions, and in particular, do not depend on the way
we define "loose" or "strict," on whether deficit, debt, or institutional
constraints are in place, on the type of statistical tests we employ and,
to a large extent, on the statistics we consider.
We argue that the main reason for why fiscal constraints make so
little difference for macroeconomic fluctuations is the ability of state
governments to work around the rules and transfer expenditure items
to either less restricted accounts, or to less constrained portions of the
government. In addition, the presence of rainy days funds effectively
makes it possible to limit current expenditure cuts at times when the
constraints become binding. Given that constraints apply only to a por-
tion of the total budget, that no formal provision for the enforcement of
the constraints exist and that rainy days funds play a buffer-stock role,
it is not surprising to find that tight fiscal constraints do not statistically
alter the magnitude and the nature of macroeconomic fluctuations.
Our results have important implications for the design of fiscal restric-
tions. If constraints are imposed to keep government behavior under
control, tight restrictions may be the wrong way to go, since they sim-
ply imply more creative accounting practices, unless they come together
with clearly stated and easily verifiable enforcement requirements. That
is to say, tight fiscal constraints are neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for good government performance. On the other hand, if con-
straints are imposed to reduce default probabilities, or to limit the effects
that local spending has on average area wide inflation, and given thatThe Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Constraints 357
their negative macroeconomic effects appear to be marginal, tight con-
straints with some carefully selected escape route could be preferable.
Although it is tempting to do so, we should warn the reader against
using the evidence to draw conclusions about the reform of the SGP.
We would like to do this despite the fact that Canova and Pappa (2003)
have shown that the response of macroeconomic variables to fiscal
shocks in the two monetary unions share a number of important simi-
larities. Three reasons motivate our concerns. First, labor markets in
the U.S. are sufficiently flexible, people move and other margins (such
as relative prices) adjust to absorb macroeconomic shocks. Europe is
different in this respect and the imposition of tighter fiscal restrictions
in the EMU may have completely different effects. Second, since fiscal
constraints in the U.S. almost always exclude capital account expendi-
tures, the conclusions we reach are not necessarily applicable to situa-
tions like EMU where nongolden rule type of constraints are in place.
Third, social security, medical and welfare expenditures constitute the
largest portion of current account expenditure of European countries,
while they are a tiny portion of expenditure of U.S. states. Furthermore,
we would like to underscore that none of our conclusions implies the
abandonment of some kind of legislated fiscal restraint and that fiscal
constraints can have beneficial distributional and long run effects.
Notes
We would like to thank G. Tabellini, R. Perotti, K. West, R. Clarida, J. Frankel, G. Zoega
and the participants of seminars at IGIER and ISOM, Reykjavick for comments and
suggestions.
1. The data stop in 1995, since there is no data on state CPI prices thereafter. We have used
an alternative specification where state CPI prices were substituted with state implicit
price deflator data, which are available from 1985-2003. We have selected the 1969-95
sample because it is longer and potentially more interesting.
2. We have examined variants of the model using e.g., revenues and expenditures mea-
sured in percentage of Gross State Product (GSP); GSP per-capita and employment not
scaled by union wide averages and state variables in growth rates (but not per-capita
terms). We have also run a model where instead of fiscal variables we use the residual of
a preliminary regression of these variables on either union wide variables or the variables
of the region where the state is located. The results we present are qualitatively invariant
to all of these changes.
3. Q(6) is chosen from the class of rotation matrices, where two directions are rotated at
one time. The grid of 6 e (0, n) includes 500 values. More details are in Canova and De
Nicolo (2002). By rotating more than two directions at a time, one can explore systemati-
cally the space of identification. Given the computational burden of such an approach
and given that there are 48 states for which such a procedure needs to be run, we have
only examined primitive bivariate rotations.358 Canova & Pappa
4. Poterba (1995) reports that in one fourth of U.S. states, budget rules restrict less than
50 percent of total budget.
5. In Kansas stabilization funds were introduced in 1993, in Maryland in 1985, in Missis-
sippi in 1982, in Utah in 1986, in West Virginia in 1981 and in Washington in 1981.
6. This is achieved computing the policy rule for each state, given the identification
scheme. The policy rule for a typical state of each group is calculated weighing each
state's coefficients by their standard deviations as described in section 2.
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Appendix A: Data Sources and Definitions
U.S. data are annual from 1969 to 1995, real, seasonally adjusted and per capita.
U.S. Census Bureau is the source unless otherwise indicated.
State Population: total state population in thousands.
Gross state product (in constant 1982 prices): Obtained from Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) from 1977; before 1977 we used the series from Oved Yosha's
U.S. State-Level Macroeconomic Databank (www.tau.ac.il/yosha ).
State revenue: total state and local revenue.
State expenditure: Direct expenditure—capital outlays. Direct expenditure
measures all expenditures other than intergovernmental expenditures. It
includes both state and local expenditures and covers all funds available to the
state government.
State debt: total state and local debt outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. It
includes short term debt and long run guaranteed and nonguaranteed (revenue
bonds) debt. The decomposition of long run total debt into two components is
available only from 1977.
State employment: total full and part time state and local employment (from
BLS).
State Prices: State prices are from Del Negro (1998). The price level for state
i is computed as: Pjt = w
u. P"jt + (1 - w")P
Rit where P
Rit denotes the price level in
rural areas of state i and comes from the Monthly Labor Review data of the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (after 1978) and the "cost of living for intermediate
level budget" from the same source (before 1978). zv
u. measures the fraction of
population living in rural areas of state i and comes from the Statistical Abstract
of the U.S. P\ is constructed as P\ = l
Kk=1 a
ktP\ + (1 - Y,
Kk=l(o
k)P\ where P\ is
the CPI in metropolitan area k obtained from the ACCRA (American Chamber
of Commerce Realtors Association) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics data on
CPI for Urban Consumers (CPI-U) and CPI by Regions and by Urban Popula-
tion and a>
kj is the percentage of urban population living in metropolitan area
k obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis site. P
Bit is the CPI in other
urban areas taken from the Monthly Labor Review data of the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. State CPI is normalized so that in each year their population average
coincides with the U.S. CPI.The Macroeconomic Effects of Fiscal Constraints 361
Federal Aid Total: total aid provided to local and state governments by the
Federal Government.
State GSP Deflators: Computed from real and nominal state GSP data (from
BEA).
U.S. aggregate data for real GDP, interest rates, CPI and oil prices come from
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FREDII data bank. Data on aggregate
population and federal aid to comes from the U.S. Census.Comment
Kenneth D. West, University of Wisconsin and NBER
Let me begin with a summary of this interesting and informative paper.
Canova and Pappa use annual panel data from the 48 continental U.S.
states to study the relationship between fiscal constraints on the one
hand and macroeconomic behavior on the other. They split the data
in two according to each of nine dichotomous indicators of fiscal
constraints. These indicators measure the stringency of balanced
budget laws, the stringency of debt restrictions, and some political
measures such as whether the governor has line item veto power over
the budget.
Most of the results rely on VAR estimates. The VARs contain basic
state-wide data, along with macro variables such as interest rates and
oil prices.
One set of results uses the VAR residuals to compare variances and
correlations for the two groups: variance of state output, correlation
between (state) government consumption and state employment, and
so on. Table 3 indicates that one can rarely reject the null that the two
moments for the two groups are the same. (Okay, I should say "reject at
conventional significance levels" rather than just "reject," but here and
throughout the phrase "at conventional significance levels" should be
assumed.) As well, Figure 1 suggests that point estimates are not much
different.
Two other exercises rely on results from a VAR in which shocks are
orthogonalized in a certain way. The authors compare VAR responses
to government consumption and to balanced budget shocks, in groups
split according to a couple of key indicators. Same old story: one rarely
rejects the null that the responses are the same for the two groups. As
well, there is little economic difference in the point estimates (Figures
3-6). Finally, the authors solve the identified VAR for equations for
government consumption and for balanced budget expenditures. PointComment 363
estimates seem to me to sometimes be different for the two groups (Table
5). But those differences generally are not statistically significant.
The authors conclude that rules to restrict fiscal behavior have little
macroeconomic import in the U.S., so the deficit restrictions embodied
in the stability and growth pact may not have much effect in Europe.
My first comment concerns identification. Canova and Pappa fol-
low a long list of papers that have compared macro behavior in states
with relatively tight budget rules to states with relatively loose rules.
The implicit assumption in this literature is that the split into tight and
loose rules is more or less exogenous to the behavior being studied.
As the authors note, if the only states that impose tight rules are ones
in which imposition is relatively costless because state spending and
revenue happen to be relatively acyclical, then a finding that output is
equally volatile in states with and without budget rules would not be
informative about the effects of budget rules in states whose revenue
and spending are strongly cyclical.
I do not have a strong sense of whether or not the decision to impose
tight budget rules is exogenous to business cycle characteristics of the
states. But I am reassured that the strictness of budget rules is corre-
lated with the general political tenor of the state, which I presume to
be largely independent of business cycle characteristics. Take a look at
that "ACIR" column in Table 2. This index runs from zero to ten. Zero
means minimal restrictions. Ten means a state budget rules as strict as
they come. One's eye detects a tendency for low values (laxer budget
rules) to occur in states with a more liberal outlook, which, in this elec-
tion season (I write in July 2004) I measure as: voted for Gore in 2000.
Indeed, suppose we follow Bohn and Inman (1996, p35) and somewhat
arbitrarily choose 6 as a low value of the index. There are 13 states whose
ACIR score is less than or equal to six. Of these 13 states, ten voted for
Gore in 2000 (CA, CT, IL, MD, MA, MI, NY, PA, VT, WI), three for Bush
(LA, NH, NV). Put differently, weak budget rules (i.e., an ACIR score of
six or less) are found in ten of the 19 states that voted for Gore but only
three of the 29 states that voted for Bush. (Recall that Alaska, Hawaii
and the District of Columbia are excluded from the sample, so there are
only 48 states in Table 2.)
My second comment relates to results in related literature on fis-
cal policy in U.S. states. My cursory reading of the literature is that
budget rules do have perceptible effects on budget variables. For exam-
ple, Bohn and Inman (1996) find that the general fund surplus is higher
in states with a no carryover provisions; Wagner and Elder (2004) find364 West
that state government consumption is smoother in states whose rainy
day funds are governed by more stringent rules. But whether state bud-
get rules have substantial effects on non-budget macro variables, which
is the subject of the present paper, is rather less clear. Alesina and Bay-
oumi (1996) conclude no, while Levinson (1998) concludes yes. Recent
papers by Fatas and Mihov (2001, 2003) find mixed results. Fatas and
Mihov (2003) find that some macro variables are affected by some char-
acteristics of fiscal policy. For example, output is more volatile in states
with strict rules on withdrawals from rainy day funds. But there seems
to be no effect from strict rules about carryover or from gubernatorial
veto power. Thus Canova and Pappa find unusually little evidence that
fiscal rules have macroeconomic effects, perhaps for reasons outlined in
the sixth section of the paper.
My third comment is that in my view the authors focused too much
on testing the hypothesis of equal effects. It would have been useful
to present point estimates. Are the point estimates for states with tight
restrictions systematically (if not statistically) different from those
with weak restrictions? Figure 1 is a step, but only a step, in the right
direction. Also, it would have been useful to present some confidence
intervals, or other hypothesis tests. In most tests, one cannot reject null
effects that are identical. Is it also true that one cannot reject the null
that (say) output is half as volatile in states with weak restrictions?
My final comment concerns the relevance of the results for Europe.
Canova and Pappa have supplied a nice list of reasons why the results
might not be relevant. Let me add one more: In the U.S., the union-wide
government (the Federal government) plays a much bigger economic
role than do the governments of the individual states. In Europe the case
is the opposite. It may be that budget rules in the U.S. states have little
effect in part because the Federal government provides extra smoothing
to states that impose such rules: progressivity of Federal income taxes,
for example, insures that ceteris paribus less tax revenue is taken from
states with lower income, thereby providing some extra smoothing to
states whose tight budget rules might otherwise cause sever recessions.
That Canova and Pappa include Federal aid to the states in the VAR
provides partial protection against smoothing by the Federal govern-
ment, but as my reference to progressive taxation shows, only partial
protection. The fact that there are two important fiscal authorities in the
U.S. states also leaves a gap between the data and the theoretical mod-
els cited by Canova and Pappa, because those models assume a single
fiscal authority.Comment 365
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Gylfi Zoega, University of Iceland and Birkbeck College
This is a well-written and interesting paper. The paper uses data from
48 U.S. states for the sample period 1969-1995 to study an interesting
macroeconomic question, which is whether self-imposed fiscal rules at
the state level increase output volatility. In other words, do states that
have committed themselves to limit their annual budget deficits face
more severe business cycles due to an inability to pursue countercycli-
cal fiscal policies? The answer provided is clear and crisp: there is no
statistically significant difference—in terms of the variance of output,
employment and prices—across groups of states defined in terms of
the severity of their fiscal restrictions. Moreover, there is no significant
difference in the impact of fiscal variables across the different groups of
states or in the type of fiscal rules being followed.
Any good paper is bound to raise further questions in the mind of
the reader. This paper falls into that category and does even better by
trying to provide answers to some of those questions. According to the
initial hypothesis, states with fiscal restrictions cannot pursue counter-
cyclical fiscal policy to the same extent as those without such rules and
this leads to more volatility. The rejection of the null hypothesis then
gives rise to further possibilities. There is the possibility that fiscal pol-
icy is genuinely irrelevant for the cycle while an alternative hypothesis
says that the states manage to get around these rules, hence making
them ineffective. Another alternative hypothesis would be that there is
an inherent endogeneity problem in that only states with solid finances
and small business cycles adopt the rules. Clearly, an explicit analysis
of these further possibilities is important before any conclusions can
be drawn about the possible adverse consequences of fiscal restrictions
in the United States. The paper concludes that what renders the fiscal
restrictions ineffective is the states' use of creative accounting, not any
inherent ineffectiveness of fiscal policy nor a selection problem.Comment 367
The paper offers a sequence of empirical results that gradually build
up a picture of fiscal restraints not affecting macroeconomic perfor-
mance. No differences arise between states with loose restrictions and
those with more binding restrictions when these are defined using
a variety of criteria. The paper reads like a series of convincing non-
results: there are no differences when it comes to the variance of output,
the variance of employment, the variance of the price level or the vari-
ance of state expenditures (all normalized by country averages), nor are
there any differences in the correlation of output and state spending,
employment and state spending and prices and state spending. The
authors then ask whether states with greater output volatility also have
greater volatility of state expenditures or a different level of expendi-
tures. The answer is negative for both countries facing loose restric-
tions as well as those facing more binding restrictions. Similarly, there
appears to be no relationship between the variance of output and the
correlation between output and state expenditures. One might expect
a negative correlation—implying counter-cyclical fiscal policies—to
imply less volatile output but this is not the case both when we look at
either group of states. The authors emphasize the similarities across the
two groups of states, the fact that the relationships (or rather non-rela-
tionships) look no different for those states with tighter restrictions.
I would like to draw attention to the absence of any relationship in
the first place. Let's go back to the volatility of output and the correla-
tion between output and expenditures. If active fiscal policy reduced
the volatility of output, we would find that the more positive (negative)
is the correlation between output and expenditures, the larger (smaller)
should be the variance of output, other things equal. But this is not
the case for either group, not even those facing loose restrictions. Fiscal
policy appears not to be effective when tried—the state with the most
volatile output has the second largest negative correlation between
expenditures and output. Surprisingly, this is a state that is required
to balance the budget within the current fiscal cycle! One might be
tempted to draw the conclusion from this evidence that fiscal policy at
the state level—even when attempted—is ineffective. This would then
explain why restricting such (ineffective) policies did not affect the vol-
atility of output, prices and employment. Instead, the authors empha-
size the similarities between the two groups—one having states that are
required to balance the budget each year and the other having states
that do not have to do this—and conclude that state governments use
creative accounting to avoid constraints when they become binding:368 Zoega
Governments can shift spending to local governments or use stabiliza-
tion funds to fund spending when tax revenues fall during recessions.
In support of their proposed explanation, the authors show that there is
no significant difference in deficits and debt levels between groups with
looser and tighter fiscal restrictions. The same applies to the volatility
of deficits and debt. Moreover, local (country) expenditures appear to
have risen more in states with more severe fiscal restrictions, which
support the creative-accounting explanation of the apparent macroeco-
nomic irrelevance of budgetary restrictions.
The authors do not forget to consider the case of reverse causality
that states with smaller business cycles chose to adopt fiscal constraints
because an active fiscal policy was not needed. The paper goes some
way to deal with this issue by studying the behavior of macroeconomic
variables before and after the imposition of fiscal restrictions in the state
of Tennessee in 1977. The authors find no change in the behavior of the
variables, once again suggesting the irrelevance of fiscal restrictions.
Once the experience with fiscal restrictions in the United States has
been assessed, the question may arise in the mind of the reader: what
are the implications for the European Growth and Stability Pact? The
authors warn the reader not to use their evidence to draw conclusions
about possible reforms of the GSR I would like to make the further point
that the econometric methodology used is not appropriate for Euro-
pean data and, more fundamentally, the questions asked in this paper
are the wrong one for Europe. Finally, I will argue that the enforcement
of the GSP may turn out to be harmful for employment and growth on
the Continent.
European labor markets have at least three important characteristics
that set them apart from the U.S. labor market. First, there are persistent
regional—not to mention country—differences in rates of unemploy-
ment and levels of economic activity. The southern part of England has
for a long time done much better than the northern regions, as well
as Scotland and Wales. There is also a persistent difference between
the performance of the western and eastern regions of Germany and
between northern and southern Italy. Second, the adjustment mecha-
nisms to labor-market shocks are different in Europe and also differ
between European countries. Decressin and Fatas (1995) studied the
adjustment mechanisms for European regions, Jimeno and Bentolila
(1995) studied Spanish regions, Blanchard and Katz (1992) American
states and, finally, Bianchi and Zoega (1996 and 1999) British regions. It
appears that migration plays a key role in the U.S. so that labor-demandComment 369
shocks have only a small transitory effect on regional unemployment.
In Europe, however, it is through changes in labor-force participation—
including early retirement and disability pensions—that employment
is affected in the short run and through migration in the long run. Spain
and the UK are exceptions, unemployment responds more to shocks
and its changes last longer. In the UK relative regional unemploy-
ment rates appear to be either non-stationary or, if there is any conver-
gence over time, it is extremely slow. Pissarides and McMaster (1990)
found that migration responds very slowly to differences in regional
unemployment. One reason for the persistent differences in regional
unemployment rates in Britain can be found in the housing mar-
ket but welfare and education policies may also be important. Third,
national unemployment rates change more in the medium than in the
short term: Medium term changes dominate business cycles. Persistent
national, as well as regional, unemployment series exhibit infrequent
shifts in the mean rather than genuine unit-root type behavior. The rea-
sons for these infrequent shifts are of course very interesting. At this
point the verdict is still out: the interplay of institutions and macro-
economic shocks may be important, perhaps the institutions devised
in the first two or so decades following the war were appropriate for
fast-growing economies that had been starved of capital and suffered
in terms of wealth and casualties. But these may have been inappro-
priate when growth slowed down in the 1970s, the cost of capital rose
and the price of energy jumped to unprecedented levels. However, it is
doubtful whether the conduct of fiscal policy—and monetary policy for
that matter—offers a clue to the reasons for these persistent unemploy-
ment elevations. This is even clearer in the case of persistent regional
differences in unemployment rates: the reason why unemployment in
the north of England has for very many decades been higher than that
in the south has not much to do with the cyclical behavior of public
spending and taxes, the accumulation of public-sector debt, nor for that
matter monetary policy. The supply side appears more important than
the demand side.
It follows that normalizing regional European data—such as employ-
ment and output—by country averages or normalizing country employ-
ment and output by European averages will yield non-stationary
variables that make the empirical methods used in this paper inappro-
priate; in particular the calculation of variances and impulse response
functions would be problematic. Moreover, in light of the different set
of problems faced by the Continent, the research question may not be370 Zoega
the most interesting one. The roots of the Continent's more significant
problems do not lie in persistent budget deficits and rising levels of
public debt. Instead, the problems can be found in the composition of
public spending; high levels of social benefits, housing subsidies, state
ownership of enterprises, capital market imperfections and so forth. But
if the Growth and Stability Pact does not help much in solving Europe's
problems, is it possible that it may have harmful effects? Unfortunately,
the answer to this question may be affirmative. In a recent paper, John
Driffill and Marcus Miller (2003) show how reunified Germany is likely
to experience higher unemployment and slower growth because of
the pact. The country combines a rich and productive western part
and an eastern economy in transition. These authors show that in a
model where unions play a big role in wage bargaining and transition
imposes a substantial burden on the government's finances, the GSP is
likely to increase unemployment and retard growth relative to a policy
of tax smoothing. Moreover, I would argue, there is the danger that
the GSP will distract politicians from the real problems their countries
face. There is no doubt that the GSP at least has the attention of poli-
ticians. Before taking office Chancellor to be Gerhard Schroeder was
quoted in the newspaper die Welt as saying that something would start
to "crumble" if the Stability and Growth Pact was not upheld. Perhaps
the sounds of a crumbling economy will first be heard when the pact is
upheld in times of recessions and domestic restructuring.
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